Ancient Greek Civilization in the Fifth Century

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In the period between 500 and 362 B.C. the city-state civilization of Greek attained its fullest development. The Athenians of the 5th century were able to create the democracy for which the 6th century reforms of Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes had paved the way; Greek art, literature, and philosophy rose to new heights. Nevertheless, by 362 B.C. the city-state, as a dominant political institution, was on the decline, while the civilization which it had made possible was facing an even more brilliant future.

The 5th century opened with an invasion of Greece by the Persians. For two decades the independence of Greece hung in the balance, but the Greeks, united under the leadership of Sparta and Athens, finally managed to repel the invaders. After the great victories which removed the Persian threat to mainland Greece, the Spartans, whose domestic situation did not permit an aggressive foreign policy, resigned their hegemony in favor of the Athenians. The latter then formed a league of maritime Greek states with the object of carrying the war into Asia Minor and freeing the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. Shortly before the middle of the 5th century, the Athenians took steps to reduce their allies to the position of subjects. The result was the creation of a fairly large Aegean empire with its capital at Athens; the economic benefits that accrued from the empire made possible Athenian democracy and the flowering of Athenian culture. The Spartans, however, were drawn once more into Greek politics by the demands of their more economic imperialism. Sparta and her allies on the one side, and Athens and her empire on the other, engaged in a series of conflicts which were brought to a conclusion with the complete collapse of Athens at the end of the 5th century. After this the Spartans, partly because they had become imperialists and partly as an extension of their 6th century Peloponnesian policy, began to force their rule upon all of Greece. The movement of reaction against Sparta was led by Athens and Thebes and by 370 B.C. Spartan power had been broken. During the next eight years a Theban imperialist movement also rose and collapsed. By 362 B.C. all traces of Greek unity had vanished and there was no Greek state powerful enough to force unification upon the others. As a result, the exhausted Greeks fell easy prey to the newly risen Macedonian kingdom of the north.

The numerous conflicts of the period were caused partly by the traditional separatism and desire for local independence that were the heritage of the Dark Ages, but more fundamental issues were involved. The capitalist system had produced within each city-state an antagonism between the wealthy minority which held most of the agricultural and industrial property and the poverty-stricken masses that agitated for a redistribution of land other forms of wealth. Overlying this economic conflict was a corresponding battle between two political philosophies; oligarchy and democracy. The rich naturally favored a restriction of the franchise, whereas the poor desired greater participation in the government in order that they might gain their economic ends. These party struggles disrupted domestic peace and often cut across city-state lines, for the oligarchs or the democrats of one city often aided the members of the corresponding party in another city. Thus, civil wars frequently led to "international conflicts." Then, too, the policy of the Persians, after their failure to subjugate the mainland Greeks, involved continual interference. The Persians wished to keep the Greeks divided and weak, because if the Greeks united they were sure to attack the Persian holdings in Asia Minor. Therefore, if any one Greek state threatened to become too strong, the Persians were always ready to give financial and military support to the other Greek cities.

We have traced the rise of the Persian Empire from its beginnings under Cyrus the Great about 550 B.C..through the European conquests of Darius in the two decades preceding 500 B.C..After the fall of the Lydian kingdom of Croesus the Asiatic Greeks had become Persian subjects. In most of the Greek cities of Asia Minor local tyrants were set up to rule as representatives of the Persian king. The Persians also gained a foothold in Thrace, and they undoubtedly hoped to extend their rule over the Aegean islands.

Where was the Persian advance to end? Although the Persians already possessed more territory than their small ruling caste could hold conveniently, it was felt that further conquests were necessary. As long as the malcontents of Asiatic Greece could flee across the Aegean to a safe refuge in Greece proper - where they could make plans for organizing rebellions in Asia Minor - the Persian control of the Asiatic Greeks would be uncertain. Therefore, the next logical step for the Persian government appeared to be the conquest of Greece itself. Moreover, the Persians felt that there were certain scores with Athens and Sparta which ought to be settled. Hippias, the Athenian tyrant, had fled to Asia Minor and had asked the Persians to reinstate him at Athens. A Persian request to the Athenians to take Hippias again as their ruler had been refused in a manner which was far from polite. In addition, the Spartans had become the allies of Croesus. Even though they had not sent aid to Croesus when Cyrus attacked him, the Persians bore them a grudge.

The immediate cause for war between the Persians and the Greeks was provided by the so-called Ionian Revolt, an uprising of the Asiatic Greeks which began about 499 B.C. The Ionians were dissatisfied with their tyrants, they disliked the high Persian taxes, and they had suffered economic reverses. In the closing years of the 6th century the prosperity of Ionia had declined because of the competition provided by Phoenician, Carthaginian, and mainland Greek traders. The revolt began at Miletus and spread to other Asiatic towns. Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletus and leader of the revolt, came to Greece to seek aid. He secured help at Athens and at Eretria (in Euboea), but the Spartans, though almost persuaded, finally decided to remain aloof. Since the Persians were caught unawares by the uprising, the rebels at first met with success. Sardes, the old Lydian capital which was now a Persian administrative center, was sacked and burned. As the Persians regained their composure and were able to bring in reinforcements, the tide of battle turned. The Athenians and Eretrians became afraid and deserted the Ionians and by 494 the last embers of the rebellion had been stamped out. Persian control over Asia Minor was tightened, heavier taxes were imposed, and the Persians began to consider measures of retribution against Eretria and Athens.

Darius the Great, who now occupied the Persian throne, dispatched two expeditions against Greece, one in 492 and another in 490. His objective was primarily punitive. Persian prestige had suffered, and if the Athenians and Eretrians were made to feel the might of the Great King, then perhaps the mainland Greeks would be dissuaded from further meddling. The first Persian expedition got no further than Macedonia where it had to turn back when its fleet was destroyed by a storm off Mount Athos. The second attack was made directly across the Aegean to Euboea. Eretria was besieged and a Persian force was landed on the Plain of Marathon in Attica about twenty miles northeast of Athens. The Athenians planned to go to the relief of Eretria, but the occupation of Marathon pinned down their forces in Attica. And that was the Persian plan - first to reduce Eretria and then to attack Athens. The Athenians, realizing the danger, appealed to Sparta, but before help arrived from that quarter, Eretria fell and the whole Persian force was freed for the move on Athens. The Athenian army at Marathon was thus placed in somewhat of a predicament. If they remained where they were, holding the road from Marathon to Athens, the Persians at Eretria could sail to Athens and attack the virtually undefended city, and if they retreated from Marathon, the Persian force there could advance unmolested. Time was of the essence; the Spartans had not come, and something must be done at once. The Athenians descended to the Plain of Marathon, drove the Persians into the sea, and then proceeded back to Athens by a forced march where they prepared to fight again the following morning when the Persian fleet appeared in the Bay of Phalerum. This discouraged the Persians, who had had enough at Marathon, and they sailed away. Shortly after, the Spartans arrived, but they could only view the slaughter at Marathon and listen to the Athenian boasting of victory. Although the Battle of Marathon was no great thing from the military point of view, it gave the Greeks the confidence they needed to oppose the Great King in the future.

Before another invasion could be organized, Darius died. His successor, Xerxes, was too busy with revolts within the empire to bother about the Greeks for several years. But at last he was persuaded by his advisors that the Greek problem could only be solved by the conquest of Greece itself. There were many around Xerxes who promoted the new action against the Greeks. One of them was Mardonius, the general in 492 who had been forced to turn back at Athos; another was Hippias, still alive and still anxious to return to Athens - Hippias had accompanied the expedition of 490 but had been disappointed of restoration by the events of Marathon; another was Demaratus, former king of Sparta, who had been recently deposed by his colleague, crusty old Cleomenes; and still another seems to have been a mysterious soothsayer Onomacritus who had lived at Athens under the Peisistratid regime.

Careful plans were laid for the invasion. A huge army and fleet were to proceed along the coast of Thrace and Macedonia into Greece. Stores and provisions were accumulated in neutral territory along the projected line of march, and two pontoon bridges were built across the Hellespont. A canal was dug through the isthmus behind Mount Athos so that the fleet might avoid another disaster. In the autumn of 481 Xerxes himself came to Sardes where his forces were being mustered; he reviewed the preparations and made ready for an invasion in the following spring.

The Greeks could not be unaware of the impending danger. Athens and the Peloponnesian League were determined to resist, but the Thessalians, Thebans, and Argives decided to remain neutral. The first could see no possibility of stopping the Persians, the Thebans hoped that the Athenians would be punished and humiliated, and the Argives were hoping for the destruction of Sparta. The Delphic oracle, perhaps fearing that its treasures would be plundered, counseled submission. To make matters worse, Cleomenes, the fiery old Spartan king, had become insane, and the Greeks in the west in Sicily could send no aid because they were momentarily expecting a Carthaginian invasion (prearranged by Persia.)

Athens, though determined to resist, was torn by party strife. In order to understand the situation, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the century. Three parties at least can be found in Athens around the year 500 B.C.: the partisans of Hippias who hoped for the restoration tyranny, the Alcmaeonidae who were tending toward conservatism, and a popular party which soon found a leader in Themistocles, who held the archonship in 493 B.C. The identity of the fire-eaters who got Athens into the Ionian affair in 499-498 is uncertain, but it is clear that the Athenians repented of their audacity and tried to appease Persia by electing Peisistratids to office in 496 and possibly in 497. Then the tide turned and anti-Persian leaders were chosen: Themistocles was one of these, and Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, was another. Miltiades, whose father had been put to death by the tyrants, had been living in a colony in Thrace. He had accompanied Darius on the Scythian expedition and had incurred Persian hatred when he attempted to sabotage Darius by suggesting to the other Greeks in the Persian entourage that they destroy Darius' bridge across the Danube while he was still on the northern bank chasing the Scythians. When the Persians under Mardonius had planned their first invasion of Greece, Miltiades was one of the ten generals, and it was he who engineered the attack which drove the Persians into the sea at Marathon. After Marathon Miltiades was placed in charge of a fleet detailed to pursue the Persians, but he turned aside for some reason to attack the island of Paros. If the attack had been successful, no questions would have been asked, but the Athenians were defeated with severe losses. Miltiades was prosecuted by the conservatives and although he died before the trial ended, he was nevertheless fined fifty talents. Ironically enough, Miltiades' fine was paid by his son, Cimon, who later married into the clan of the Alcmaeonidae and became a conservative leader, while Miltiades' prosecutor was Xanthippus, already allied by marriage with the Alcmaeonidae, whose son was Pericles, the great democratic leader of the future who became the rival of Cimon.

Opposition to Persia grew after the success at Marathon. Both conservatives and liberals included anti-Persian planks in their campaign platforms, but Themistocles was able to outmaneuver the conservatives. While they insisted that Athens must build a big army to combat the impending Persian invasion, Themistocles argued that the Greeks as a whole lacked ships, that the Spartans and their allies could supply sufficient land forces, and that the Athenians would be wise to build a fleet. The resources were at hand. Through the discovery of a rich new vein of silver at Laurium in Attica, ships could be financed, and the common people of Attica, who could not be armed and trained as infantrymen, could be utilized as rowers for the ships.

A new political weapon was available which enabled Themistocles to silence his adversaries. This was ostracism, an ingenious device which gave the people as a whole a means of controlling state policies. Ostracism, traditionally attributed to Cleisthenes, was probably a brain child of the resourceful Themistocles. It was instituted in 488 B.C., and its procedure was as follows: In any year, if it seemed advisable, the Athenians might go to the polls to cast their ballots for the man considered "most dangerous to the state." The winner of this unpopularity contest had to leave Athens and go into exile for ten years. The Athenians ostracism, which is so called because the voters scratched the names of the candidates on broken pieces of potters (ostraka), was the reverse of the modern vote of confidence, but it served its end equally well. Ostracism ordinarily occurred when there were two leaders who advocated opposite policies. The people thus cast their votes for the man whose policies they disliked, and he would be removed from the scene by exile, thereby leaving his opponent to carry out the alternative program undisturbed.

The first person to be ostracized in 487 was a Peisistratid partisan, but in the next four years prominent members of the Alcmaeonid party were eliminated by the same route. The last to go was the pro-Alcmaeonid Aristides who had strenuously opposed the big-navy policy of Themistocles. Thus, Themistocles rid himself of his rivals and could at last make the necessary preparations to resist the invasion of Xerxes.

When Xerxes began in the spring of 480 to move through Thrace and Macedonia, his army supported by a big fleet, the Greeks had worked out a scheme of defense. They would use their small forces to best advantage by trying to hold the passes along the route which the Persians must travel. The first stand at Tempe on the northern border of Thessaly failed because the Persian fleet was able to sail in behind the defenders and turn their position. At Thermopylae however, there was a more defensible position. The pass was narrower and the Greek fleet could hold the straits between Euboea and the mainland in order to prevent the Persian fleet from repeating the maneuver which had been so successful at Tempe. The small Greek force, commanded by the young Spartan king Leonidas, held out at Thermopylae for several days, but when a traitor showed the Persians another route over the mountains, Leonidas was surrounded, his troops annihilated, and the way was open for the Persians into central Greece. Thebes and Boeotia offered no resistance, Athens was easily taken.

The position of the Greeks was now truly desperate. The Spartans, with their usual ingenuity, proposed to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth to prevent the invasion of the Peloponnesus, but Themistocles demonstrated the futility of this plan by pointing out that the Persian fleet could land troops at any place in the Peloponnesus and repeat the strategy of Tempe. The best chance of the Greeks, he said, was in forcing a naval encounter. Thus, the decisive sea battle of Salamis was precipitated. The Persian fleet was lured into the narrow strait between the Island of Salamis and the mainland of Attica, virtually ambushed and was certainly destroyed by the small, swift Greek warships. Without a fleet the Persian advance was stalled and their communications with Asia were in jeopardy. Furthermore, the campaigning season was nearly over. Xerxes went back to Persia, and Mardonius was killed, and the remnants of the Grand Army of the Great King from Greece, the Greeks rejoiced in a well-earned victory.

It was not enough however, to have driven the Persians from Greece. Encouraged by a victory over the Persians at Mycale in Asia Minor - tradition placed the battle on the same day as the Battle of Plataea - the Greeks planned to follow up their advantage by carrying the war across the Aegean for the purpose of liberating the Ionian cities. A combined Greek fleet began to operate in the Aegean and many island and mainland states were freed.

At the same time Greek unity began to disappear. The Spartans proposed that structures ruined by vandalism of the Persians should not be rebuilt but left as they were to remind posterity of what the Persians had done. The sentiment was a laudable one. The Spartans had nothing to lose by such a policy because Sparta had been untouched by the war. But at Athens this would have meant that not only the temples and other structures would have been left in ruins but also the walls of the town. Athens would be an open, undefended city at the mercy of any attacker - and this might someday include the Spartans. Themistocles realized the implications of the Spartan proposal, tricked the Spartans into believing that the Athenians were in agreement, and then refortified Athens before the Spartans found out what was happening. Henceforth, Themistocles was rather unpopular in Sparta, especially so after he fortified the Peiraeus, the natural harbor of Athens, for use as a naval base.

But this was not all that Themistocles accomplished. Throughout the war military leadership had been given without much question to the Spartans. But after 479 the overbearing attitude of their generals in the field - especially in the case of Pausanias, the hero of Plataea - antagonized Greek contingents from other states while the Athenians had cultivated popularity. Moreover, the home government at Sparta was not in sympathy with the aggressive policy advocated by Pausanias. The traditional Spartan sentiment for isolation began to reassert itself, and when the other Greeks intimated that they preferred to be led by Athenians rather than Spartans, the Spartan government withdrew its troops and commanders with little protest. In 477 B.C. when the leadership devolved upon Athens, Themistocles proposed a naval confederation known to history as the Delian League.

The fundamental idea behind the Delian League was that the states interested in carrying on hostilities against Persia would ally themselves with Athens. Each state would contribute a definite quota of ships and men (or a money equivalent), and operations would be conducted each year under Athenian leadership. The league treasury and its administrative center would be located on the island of Delos. The object of the league was to free the Greeks still subject to Persia, prevent a renewal of Persian imperialism directed at Greece, and acquire enough loot from Persian territory to pay the expenses of the war. The quotas due from the member states were determined by Aristides, whose reputation for probity was universally accepted; he did not disappoint the Greeks on this occasion, for he apportioned the contributions in such a way that he earned for himself the title of "the Just." The league, once organized, met with continued success down to 468 B.C. when its forces climaxed their operations with a great naval victory which swept the Persians from the seas and completed the liberation of most of the Asiatic Greeks.

In 468 it seemed to many people that the Delian League had served its purpose and might well be disbanded. The Athenians, on the other hand, argued that the setback suffered by the Persians was only temporary. Peace had not been concluded and the Persians had not acknowledged the independence of the Ionian cities. As a matter of fact, the Persians continued to assess the Ionian tribute even though they were not able to collect it, and the assumption was that at some time in the future an accounting would be demanded. The Athenians protested that it would be unfair for the allies to withdraw from the league, thereby leaving Athens to provide protection for all at her own expense.

The real basis for the Athenian desire that the league should continue however, was that the league had been a profitable venture for Athens. Many of the allies had preferred to pay money into the league treasury at Delos rather that risk ship and men. As a result, it was the Athenian navy which had borne the brunt of the fighting. Money from the treasury had been used to finance the Athenian operations, and much had been spent in improving and enlarging the Athenian navy which had become the most powerful in Greece.

Moreover, the whole situation was closely tied up with domestic politics in Athens itself. Whereas in the Athenian army the fighting was done by those who could afford to buy armor and weapons - the upper and middle classes - in the navy the rowers were ordinarily recruited from the citizen proletariat. The fact that Athens had become a naval rather than a land power meant that the proletariat had become very useful in military operations. The Athenian proletariat capitalized on its important position to demand an increasing share in the government with the result that Athenian democracy came into existence. The navy, which was essential to the continued political predominance of the lower classes and to their financial support, could not be maintained at full strength without the funds which the league provided, and therefore the league, in one form or another, must be continued.

As early as 468 B.C. a movement of secession from the league was on foot among the allies. The Athenians however, argued that the treaties of alliance that had been made in 477 were eternally binding and might not be abrogated. When various states attempted to secede they were attacked and overpowered by Athens. Once in control, the Athenians made subjects of their rebellious allies. Control of their foreign relations was vested in the Athenian government. Usually the states were forced to accept new constitutions which set up democratic forms of government similar to those of Athens. Athenian garrisons might be stationed in the chief cities; desirable lands might be given to colonists sent out from Attica, and tribute was imposed upon the subject states. Eventually nearly two hundred cities were made subject and tributary to the Athenian government, and only a handful of the former allies retained their original status. Athenian imperialism reached its peak in the period between 461 and 445 when the democratic party at Athens was in the ascendant under the leadership of Pericles. But before considering the developments of this era, it is helpful to understand something of the internal politics in Athens after 477 B.C.

The popular party and Themistocles were definitely in the saddle after the Battle of Salamis, but the conservatives slowly began to gather strength and at last found an able and popular leader in Cimon, son of Miltiades, who had directed the naval operations of the Delian League with great success. Themistocles of course was committed to an anti-Spartan policy for both personal and political reasons; his domestic policy called for an extension of democracy, or at least a continued liberalization of the constitution, but it was on his attitude toward Persia that he finally came to grief. Themistocles came to feel that the war against Persia had gone far enough, that peace should be concluded in order that the Athenians might open up trade with Persian territory. Cimon and the conservatives, on the other hand, began to advocate friendship with Sparta and continued attacks on Persia. Their domestic policy, which they may not have emphasized, was naturally opposed to any further liberalization of the Athenian government. By 471 the contest between the parties represented by Themistocles and Cimon had reached a point where an ostracism was in order. Themistocles was the loser and went into exile as the conservatives came into power for the next nine years.

Cimon attained the zenith of his popularity with the great victory over the Persians at the Eurymedon in 468. After this an anti-Persian program held little meaning, while the anti-democratic and pro-Spartan sentiments of the conservatives came in for more attention. These were issues the popular party could use to undermine Cimon's popularity with the majority of the voters. A turning point was reached in 464 when a bloody helot revolt began in Laconia. The Spartans were hard pressed, for some of the helots dug themselves in on Mount Ithome and could not be subdued. When the Spartans finally appealed to Athens for aid, Cimon persuaded the Athenians to send a force to Laconia. This was a mistake; even with Cimon's help the helots could not be recaptured, and finally the Spartans with scant courtesy told the Athenians to go back home. Cimon had thus exposed Athens to insult by Sparta; he paid the penalty for poor judgment by incurring ostracism in 462 B.C.

The opponent of Cimon in 462 was a popular leader named Ephialtes who advocated democratic reforms, but he was assassinated the following year and the leadership of his party, which was now in the majority, passed to Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Elected to the generalship every year except one from 461 to his death in 429, Pericles was to head his party and direct the foreign and domestic affairs of Athens for a whole generation. His influence on every phase of Athenian history was so great that the whole period is called the Age of Pericles.

The policies of Pericles may be considered under two general headings: foreign and domestic. The foreign policy of Pericles from 461 to 445 was aggressively imperialistic as he tried to build up a land empire in central Greece to match the maritime empire the Athenians already possessed. The whole attempt was a dismal failure because Pericles was unrealistic and certainly no strategist. The over-all plan was attractive in theory but it had the distinct disadvantage of being unworkable.

As a liberal and the opponent of Cimon, Pericles was committed to an anti-Spartan policy, and his success in antagonizing the Spartans, the Peloponnesians, and the Thebans was outstanding. He was seduced by the attractiveness of the old Peisistratid idea of an alliance with Argos and Thessaly. The Argive alliance would theoretically drive a wedge between Sparta and Corinth (depending, of course, on the strength of Argos), while the Thessalian alliance would be a knife in the back of Thebes. The next step was to gain control of Megara, the state which lay on the Isthmus of Corinth between Athens and Corinth. Megara was persuaded to join the Athenian Empire in 459. As a matter of fact, the poor Megarians had to join Athens to keep from being gobbled up by Corinth. From the Athenian point of view, the adherence of Megara was a fine thing. The two harbors of Megara provided Athens with ports on either side of the Isthmus of Corinth, while Athenian possession of Megara would keep the Peloponnesians from marching up the isthmus to join the Thebans.

The alliances with Argos, Thessaly, and Megara alarmed the Peloponnesians and annoyed the Spartans, but Pericles now outdid himself. In 458 the unsubdued helots on Mount Ithome were allowed by the Spartans to leave Laconia. They were promptly befriended by Athens and settled at Naupactus on the Gulf of Corinth in a position where they could prevent a Peloponnesian crossing to central Greece and possibly close the outlet to the gulf in time of war. By 458 also the Athenians had attacked Aegina, the Dorian island state in the Saronic Gulf, which would make a fine Athenian naval base. Corinth came to the aid of Aegina, and before long Thebes and Sparta had joined in the war against Athens. At first, things went well for the Athenians. Most of central Greece, including Boeotia, was overrun, and in 456 Aegina surrendered. Athenian holdings on land and sea had now reached their greatest extent.

Simultaneously with the war in Greece, Pericles had managed to get involved in a war with the Persians. Revolts had broken out in Cyprus and Egypt against Persia, and Athens sent aid to both areas. In Egypt a large Athenian expeditionary force was cut off and destroyed along with another smaller force which had been sent to supplement the first. In a short time Athens had lost 250 ships and their crews, and as a result had lost control of the sea as well. The situation was so grave in 454 that the treasury of the Delian League had to be removed from Delos to Athens for safe-keeping.

Matters continued to go from bad to worse. Pericles found that he could not fight on two fronts at once, so he enlisted the aid of Cimon, now returned from exile, with the object of making friends of Sparta. Cimon (about 451) patched up a five-year truce with Sparta; the Spartans withdrew from the war in Greece leaving their allies to fight on alone. Then Cimon was sent to Cyprus in 449 to battle the Persians. He died there and Pericles immediately made an informal peace with Persia, for without Cimon's military leadership the Athenians could not go on with confidence.

Back in Greece, Thebes, Megara, and Euboea revolted in 447. In the following year the truce with Sparta ended and the Peloponnesian armies invaded Attica itself, although a bribe of ten talents of silver provided from the Athenian treasury dissuaded the Spartans from doing any real damage to the country. The Athenians were able to recapture Euboea, but Thebes and Megara were lost forever. In 445 Athens and Sparta came to terms with the arrangement of a thirty-year truce which left Sparta's allies with no choice except to end hostilities too. The Athenians had lost their temporary land empire in central Greece, but their maritime holdings were still intact.

The period from 445 to 431 B.C. was one of armed peace. Both Athenians and Peloponnesians realized that the first war had decided nothing and that a continuation of the struggle was inevitable. Athenian imperialism was by no means dead, although it had been somewhat chastened. The Peloponnesians and Thebans felt that only the complete destruction of Athens would remove the threat to their political and commercial independence. The grand strategy of Pericles had come to nothing; all that he had accomplished was to weaken Athens and gain the undying enmity and suspicion of the other Greek states. With her great navy Athens could hold a maritime empire, but she lacked the army and the transportation and communication facilities to maintain an empire on land. Anyone but an armchair strategist should have been able to realize this; it was the true measure of the military genius of Pericles. Foolish as it might appear at first glance, the attempt to aid Cyprus and Egypt to gain independence made more sense than the grandiose plan for an empire on the mainland of Greece. Cyprus was an important source of copper, and the trade of Egypt would have enriched Athens and given her a surplus of grain. The naval operations which aid to Cyprus and Egypt entailed were feasible except that the Athenians were unable to employ their full strength because of the war in Greece.

Pericles was a better politician than a general. His domestic policies bore rich fruit, and by comparison with his foreign policy which withered on the vine, his management of affairs at home could be called successful. Under Pericles the maritime empire provided Athens with great prosperity, the city of Athens was made beautiful with handsome buildings, and the Athenian democracy flourished. One of the most important cultural contributions of Athens was the creation of a democratic form of government. This was not the work of a moment, but the result of a long evolution which reached its climax in the 5th century in the years between 461 and 429 B.C., the so-called Periclean Age. The Athenian democracy was largely the product of Greek economic developments, the Persian wars, and the creation of the Athenian navy and empire. Without the Athenian navy, which gave the proletariat a political lever, and the Athenian Empire, which provided the means to pay Athenian citizens for their participation in the government, the democracy could not have been brought into existence. Before considering the operation of the full-blown democracy, it is necessary to briefly review its evolution in the pre-Periclean period.

In the Dark Ages the monarchical form of government had existed in Athens. There was a king, a council called the Areopagus, and the assembly (ecclesia). Between about 750 B.C. and the time of Cleisthenes the Areopagus had become the stronghold of the landed aristocrats who had abolished the kingship and reduced the power of the ecclesia. The powers of the king were divided among elected aristocratic magistrates called archons. One archon was a general administrative officer for Attica, another was commander-in-chief of the army, and another was high priest. About 620 B.C. the threat of sedition forced the nobles to allow the codification of the law; it is probable that at the same time six junior archons, the thesmothetae (or keepers of the laws), were added to the original three magistrates.

Around 570 B.C. an economic and political crisis brought the reforms of Solon, and the Athenian government was transformed from an aristocratic oligarchy into a timocracy. The citizen population was divided into census classes according to its wealth; the members of the two upper classes were eligible for election to the major magistracies, and those of the third class could hold minor offices; all citizens were allowed to participate in the ecclesia and the heliaia (the great court of appeal).

The tyranny of Peisistratus produced no constitutional changes, but the persecution of the landed aristocrats made it possible for the businessmen to gain increased participation in the government. Those who fulfilled the financial qualifications for office were able to step into positions formerly held by the aristocrats. Under Cleisthenes the creation of the ten new tribes, the Council of the Five Hundred, and possibly the board of ten generals had the effect of disrupting old traditions and breaking down prejudices. The introduction of ostracism early in the 5th century enabled the masses to eliminate political leaders who were oligarchically inclined.

The period of the Persian wars was notable for conditions favoring the development of the democracy. The almost continuous state of war which existed during the first three decades of the 5th century made the ten generals the most important officials of Athens. To save themselves from the Persian conquest, the Athenians were forced to elect the best and most capable men available without regard to financial standing. The archonships, mere civic offices, paled into insignificance before the predominance of the generals. After the wars the creation of the empire and the difficulty of holding it increased the importance of the generals. The ancient authors tell us that even as early as 487 B.C. the archonship was filled by lot (sortition); in other words, the duties of the archons were routine matters, and it made little difference who filled these posts as long as the incumbents satisfied the financial qualifications stipulated by law.

Moreover, when the Athenians built up a strong fleet in the period of the Persian wars, the proletarians, who could not afford to equip themselves for the army, suddenly became valuable to the state as rowers for the ships. Naturally the new significance of the proletarians gave them a lever with which they could pry concessions from the government. Last of all, the creation of the empire brought revenue to Athens which could be used to pay public servants. As a result, persons who could not have afforded to take time from the business of earning a living to participate in governmental affairs now found it worth while to do so.

The final steps in the creation of the democracy came at the opening of the Periclean Age when the leaders of the popular party, Ephialtes and Pericles, secured the passage of laws which deprived the Areopagus of most of its power (462 B.C.). The Areopagus had already declined with the archonship, for it was composed of former archons. But in 462 the ancient council lost its guardianship of the laws and its other functions, except its judicial ones, and the bulk of its powers passed to the Council of the Five Hundred, the ecclesia, and the heliaia. The introduction of the method of choosing the archons by lot, probably masterminded by Themistocles, had automatically lowered the caliber of the personnel of the Areopagus so that its prestige must have been lessened. Even so, the composition of the court must have been conservative, if not reactionary, and it may have rejected some liberal legislation as unconstitutional. As an obstacle in the path of the growing democracy, the Areopagus had to be removed.

In the Periclean Age the Athenian democracy attained its fullest development and its most efficient operation. The governmental machinery of the democrary as well as its aims and accomplishments merit detailed description and careful consideration. As there was no legal barrier to the same person holding successive generalships, Pericles was chosen as a general on many occasions. The generals had charge of the army, the fleet, and the empire. Theoretically the generals all had equal power; but a man like Pericles, who possessed a strong personality and great political prestige, might easily influence his colleagues to do as he wished.

Almost all the other officials in Athens were chosen by lot instead of being elected. Although the archons were important as civic administrators and judges, their prestige did not match that of the generals. There were also minor officers who made up the various governing committees or boards and performed certain duties; the prison board, the police commissioners, the supervisors of the market, the state contractors, and the boards of treasurers for the important temples. The Hellenotamiae, the treasurers of the Delian League, became the treasurers for the Athenian Empire. Usually each committee or board consisted of ten members - one member chosen from each tribe by lot - and a secretary.

In the legislative and deliberative branch of the government were the boule (Council of the Five Hundred) and the ecclesia. Fifty councilors were chosen by lot each year from each of the ten tribes. The full council of the five hundred members ordinarily met four times a month; at these meetings the boule considered legislation to be laid before the ecclesia for enactment, discussed military, naval, defense, imperial, and financial problems, and scrutinized the acts of the magistrates.

When the full council was not in session a committee of fifty members remained on duty night and day to act in any emergency. All the members of this committee belonged to the same tribe and were its representatives in the council; each month the committee was changed, the representatives of the various tribes succeeding one another in rotation.

All Athenian citizens eighteen years of age or over were members of the ecclesia. This assembly met from one to four times a month; an attendance of six thousand constituted a quorum. The members of the ecclesia discussed, amended, and ratified or rejected legislative proposals submitted to it by the boule. The ecclesia received foreign emissaries, elected the generals, and alone had the power to grant citizenship. It was also the body that voted on ostracism.

During the Periclean Age the Areopagus (as a court for homicide) and other special courts continued to function, but more important were the jury courts, the dikasteria. The growth of the empire had increased the judicial business which had to be transacted at Athens, for the Athenians required all major cases arising in the subject states to be tried there. Each year a panel of six thousand jurors was drawn from the Athenian citizen body. This panel was called the heliaia, though by the mid-5th century the old Solonian court of appeal had probably ceased to function. The jurors, thus elected, were divided daily into groups of 201 - 501, or similarly large numbers and assigned to try individual cases. The archons were usually the presiding magistrates; trials began at sunrise and had to be completed by sunset; the defendant had to plead his own case, although he might hire someone to write his defense for him.

The dikasteria were a more significant factor in the government than one might suppose. The introduction of pay for jury service during the Periclean Age meant that the poor of the city of Athens were provided with some means of support. The daily wage was small, and rich men or small farmers outside the city would not be much attracted by it; but the unemployed of Athens were naturally anxious to offer themselves for jury duty. Through the courts the proletariat gained considerable political power. "The courts were in almost perpetual session; their jurisdiction extended to every aspect and department of public life; and from their decision there was no appeal."

As a result of the transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire, nearly two hundred states were reduced from the position of allies to that of subjects. The "contribution" that the allies had paid for the support of military operations against Persia became the "tribute" which was now paid to Athens. A few of the original allies remained faithful to Athens and managed to retain their freedom, but the other states were forced to turn over to Athens the conduct of their foreign relations and to submit to the establishment of democratic constitutions drawn up by the Athenians. The subject states had to bring many lawsuits to Athens for trial; they were also bound by Athenian commercial regulations. In some cases, Athenian garrisons were sent to the subject cities; often, fertile lands in the subject states were given to Athenian military colonists, the cleruchs. From this it is clear that, although the empire was productive of certain economic benefits to the subject states (the suppression of piracy and the adoption of a uniform currency); there were many just reasons for dissatisfaction.

With the details of Athenian domestic and imperial government in mind, we may now attempt an evaluation of it. A major aim of the Periclean democracy was to secure the participation of all citizens in the government. This was accomplished by throwing open the various branches of service to the entire citizen body; the three upper census classes could hold any office, and the only office not open to the fourth class was the archonship. The use of the lot was based on the theory that any man was capable of filing any position. The practice of rotation in office - forbidding successive terms in the same position - made it possible for a greater proportion of the citizens to engage in public service; the use of the committee - to perform certain tasks which might have been performed by one official - was another method of gaining the end sought by rotation. The introduction of payment for service in the dikasteria and the boule enabled even the poorest citizens to participate.

There was some attempt to insure honest and efficient government and to fix responsibility. The personal qualifications of candidates were considered; auditors examined the accounts of officials and committees; officials were liable to impeachment; and the general conduct of the government was carefully scrutinized. Maladministration might be punished by fines, exile, or execution.

The greatest benefits of the democracy were enjoyed by the masses - it might even be said that this was the main purpose of the whole system. The tremendous power of the ecclesia in which the masses secured preponderance by mere weight of numbers, the composition of the juries, and the use which was made of imperial revenues - the tribute was used to pay the rowers in the fleet, the court fines to pay the jurors - all tended to benefit the common people more than any other group. The military cleruchies scattered throughout the empire helped to relieve overpopulation at Athens, and Pericles also sponsored a colonization project at Thurii in Italy. Finally, the state expenses that could not be met by the imperial revenues were provided for by revenue extracted from the metics (resident aliens) and the rich citizens. The rich citizens were liable for the liturgies, the expensive public services were financed by individuals. A wealthy man might be requested to build and equip a warship, to pay for the training of a chorus for one of the Dionysiac plays, or to provide a feast for all the members of his tribe. It would not be fair to subject these features of the Athenian system to criticism, for they were the methods by which the chief end of a democracy might be gained - that is, the greatest good to the greatest number.

On the other hand, the Athenian democracy in operation displayed certain features which outrage modern notions of the ideal democracy.

First, the Athenian citizen body was a very limited group. Only about half of the inhabitants of Attica were citizens; the rest were metics and slaves. The Athenians of the Periclean Age had no idea of extending citizenship to others; instead, they tried to reduce the numbers of those eligible for its privileges and exemptions.

Second, the democracy was dependent upon imperialism and economic exploitation. The Athenian citizens were really a group of 150,000 oligarchs who derived their financial support from 2,000,000 subjects. The enjoyment of a democracy by each Athenian citizen was made possible by the labor of a dozen subjects of his government.

Last of all, although the point cannot be pressed, one might question whether the Athenian democracy in the Age of Pericles was actually a democracy. It is very doubtful whether the Athenian people had much to do with the formulation of fundamental governmental policies. Pericles was not a dictator, but he and his clique certainly directed the government. The masses seem to have exercised their own initiative only when they wanted something that was of special benefit to them; and as long as Pericles kept them happy and satisfied, he could propose and secure ratification for other projects which he himself favored. It might even be said that the democracy functioned most efficiently when it was under the partial dictatorship of Pericles; for after his death, when less able leaders were at the helm, the proletariat took the bit in its teeth and was responsible for many ghastly mistakes.

These criticisms should not be construed as an indictment of democracy as a system. Democracy never received a fair trial at Athens, for one very necessary element for the success of democratic government was lacking: an intelligent, well-educated citizen body. Contrary to a belief which is widespread today, the Athenian citizen body was neither unusually intelligent nor well educated; at least it was not educated for the task that it had to fulfill. Only a small group of Athenians ever received any formal education; only a minority knew how to read and write. Furthermore, it may well be asked whether the system of formal education in vogue at Athens would have helped the citizens to operate their government even if education had been available for all. It is often said that the opportunity for the actual participation of large groups of citizens in the government was an education in itself. It is true that most of the citizens well understood the workings of their governmental machinery, but it is perfectly possible to understand how a machine works yet not to know what to do with it. The real point is that the Athenians were not sound judges of policy, although Pericles claimed that they were. Socrates later demonstrated clearly that none of his contemporaries understood, or were able to think clearly about, matters of ethics, society, and economics. Precise or even general knowledge of these things were not available to the Periclean Greeks.

The subsequent history of Athenian government need not concern us here. The oligarchic government which the Spartans forced upon the Athenians at the end of the Peloponnesian War was overthrown when Athens regained her independence. Democracy was restored, and it was retained during the 4th century with only minor modifications.

Elsewhere in Greece government varied from extreme oligarchy to moderate democracy. There were frequent revolutions in the city-states during the 4th century, and the government of individual states was altered when the oligarchs or democrats rose or fell in power. The most common governmental form was the timocracy, although some of the Greek states in the west fell into the hands of tyrants who occasionally established monarchies.

Fathered by war and nurtured by imperialism, the power of Athens was to be destroyed by the same means. The great Peloponnesian War which began in 431 B.C. and ended in 404 terminated both the Athenian Empire and the economic prosperity of Thucydides, found Athens on one side with the Peloponnesians and the Thebans on the other. Idealized and glorified as a titanic struggle between two systems, democracy and its opposite, the true nature of this inglorious strife has been somewhat obscured.

Like all wars, this one had two kinds of causes: underlying and immediate. The underlying or fundamental causes were those which made the conflict inevitable, while the immediate causes were those which precipitated the hostilities at a particular time. The bitterness engendered by the earlier war between Athens and the Peloponnesians and the fear of Athenian imperialism must be listed as underlying causes, but most important was the trade rivalry between Athens and Corinth. The commercial prosperity which accrued to Athens through the empire had ruined the trade of Corinth, Megara, and Sicyon; it mattered little that these latter states were in a better natural position for trade, for Athenian predominance in trade was an artificial thing created by the empire, and as long as the empire existed Athens would have the advantage. The Spartans were not the villains of the piece; they tried to remain aloof as long as possible, but they were drawn into the situation by the insistence of the Corinthians. The war was fought on an ideological plane; the Athenians were told they were fighting for democracy, and the Peloponnesians were told they were fighting to free the world from Athenian imperialism, but thinking people must have understood the real issued. These had little propaganda value, and therefore it was not polite to mention them.

Many people living at Athens at the beginning of the war said that Pericles precipitated the conflict because his party was losing popularity and he wished to divert the minds of the Athenian voters from domestic to foreign issues. There does not seem to be much doubt that Pericles welcomed the war at this particular time, not for political reasons, but because he recognized the inevitability of the struggle and felt that the situation in 431 was favorable to Athens. The immediate causes of the war, however, were a series of crises or incidents that led up to the outbreak of hostilities.

First came the affair of Epidamnus. Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, as Corcyra was in turn a colony of Corinth. The site of Epidamnus (Dyrrhachium in modern Albania) was far removed from Athens, Corinth, and Sparta. It lay on the eastern coast of the Adriatic some distance above Corcyra (modern Corfu). About 436 B.C. stasis (civil war) between the oligarchs and democrats had broken out in Epidamnus. The oligarchs were expelled from the town, whereupon they joined with the fierce natives of the surrounding countryside and returned to invest Epidamnus with a vigor that promised success. The alarmed democrats within the town appealed to Corcyra for aid and when their request was refused, they appealed to Corinth and received a promise of aid. Corcyra then sided with the oligarchs. The Corinthian relief expedition was beaten off and the town fell to the oligarchs and their Corcyrean allies. One thing continued to lead to another. The Corinthians prepared an even larger expedition, and the alarmed Corcyreans decided to seek help from Athens.

The Athenians were interested in an alliance with Corcyra despite a Corinthian warning that such an action would be regarded as a breach of the treaty of 445 which had ended the previous war. There were three main reasons why a Corcyrean entanglement appealed to Athens: (1) Corcyra had a large navy which would constitute a valuable addition to Athenian imperial forces; (2) the Corcyreans could seal off the Corinthian gulf in time of war and prevent the Corinthian fleet from sailing out to the west, just as the Athenian navy could bottle up the Corinthian on the east in the Saronic Gulf; and (3) Corcyra and Epidamnus had formed parts of the third leg in the triangular trade between Corinth, Magna Graecia (Sicily and south Italy), and the Adriatic, and the alienation of Corcyra from Corinth would be just as damaging in peace as in war. Ideological considerations seemed unimportant; expedience outweighed the fact that the Athenians would be giving support to an anti-democratic faction and opposing the Corinthians who were helping the liberals of Epidamnus!

The Athenians did not want an open break with Corinth, yet they hated to pass up such an opportunity, they wanted to have their cake and eat it too. So, hoping for the best, they made a defensive alliance with Corcyra. The Corinthians sent 150 ships to the Adriatic, defeated the smaller Corcyrean fleet and set off in hot pursuit of the survivors. At this point, a small squadron interposed itself between Corcyreans and Corinthians. The Corinthians stopped short and begged the Athenians to withdraw. The latter refused, and the Corinthians, hesitating to attack without orders from home, bitterly sailed off. This incident alone might have begun a "hot war," but instead the cold war continued.

The second incident occurred in another remote place. A former Corinthian colony in the north Aegean, Potidaea, was subject to Athens. Fearing that the Potidaeans were on the verge of revolt, the Athenians ordered them to tear down their walls and provide hostages (432). The Potidaeans were thus driven into revolt and before the Athenians arrived to besiege the town, a Corinthian force was sent to aid Potidaea. War had not been declared, yet within besieged Potidaea there were Corinthian soldiers.

War was already imminent when the third incident took place. Pericles issued the so-called Megarian Decree which banned Megarian traders from the ports of the Athenian Empire. The object of this move was to force Megara to join Athens as it had in the previous war instead of continuing its adherence to the Peloponnesian League. The whole economy of Megara was dependent on trade and the plight of the country was soon desperate.

At the insistence of Corinth, a congress of the Peloponnesians was now called and the Athenians were accused of having broken the peace of 445. The Spartan king, Archidamus, warned the assembly of the horrors of war, but the ephors were more sympathetic to the plight of the allies. An ultimatum was dispatched to Athens: in order to avoid war the Athenians were told they must free Aegina, raise the siege of Potidaea, and rescind the Megarian Decree. They could do none of these things without the loss of prestige; they were not really expected to comply with the ultimatum, for its purpose was to force the Athenians into war and make them appear the aggressors. The ultimatum was rejected by Athens and so at last the long-awaited explosion occurred.

The naval power of Athens was to be pitted against the land power of Sparta and her allies. There was no common battlefield on which they could meet without great risk to one or the other of the combatants; like the war between the British and Napoleon, it was a struggle between a whale and an elephant. Pericles had laid his plans and was confident of success. Athens would fight a long war, a war of exhaustion. The Athenians had a war fund of six thousand talents; their opponents had no reserves. The Athenians would withdraw within their walls, the Peloponnesians could ravage the fields of Attica, but they could not capture the strongly fortified cities of Athens and the Peiraeus which were connected by the famous Long Walls. In the meantime, the Athenian fleet could sail out and ravage the coasts of the Peloponnesus, destroy enemy trade, and protect the grain ships from the Black Sea which would bring food to Athens. Year after year this would go on until the enemy was forced to his knees by economic exhaustion.

Pericles, with his keen intellect, would have made a very good chess player. He was probably adept at whatever similar board game it was that Athens played; but war is not a game, and the beautiful academic strategy of Pericles was full of defects. To begin with, few wars have been won by purely defensive tactics. Furthermore, the whole concept of defensive war is bad for morale. Secondly, the Athenians needed to possess Megara for the same reason that they had needed it in the previous war: to prevent the Peloponnesians and Thebans from joining hands. Thirdly, without Pericles to enforce the consistent application of his plan, it could hardly succeed, and he, unfortunately, died in 429 when the war had scarcely begun.

The great Peloponnesian War lasted twenty-seven years. It had two phases: the first covered the decade from 431 to 421 and it was called the War of Archidamus (after the Spartan king); then there was an uneasy truce until 414 when the second phase began: this was the Decelean War which ended in 404 B.C. The first phase began with a sneak attack by the Thebans on Plataea, the Boeotian border town allied with Athens. Plataea was a strategic point which controlled the roads leading from Boeotia into Attica and also southward to the Isthmus of Corinth. The town was not captured by surprise, as intended, but withstood a siege of several years which hampered Spartan-Theban co-operation.

The first year of the war went much as Pericles had anticipated. The Atheninas withdrew within the Long Walls, and the enemy occupied the countryside; the Athenian fleet sailed out on forays. There were few losses on either side and when winter came on, or it was time for the fall plowing, hostilities were largely suspended until the next campaigning season rolled around. In 430 matters did not go according to schedule because Athens was ravaged by a horrible plague; the only redeeming feature was that the enemy went home to escape contagion. Public sentiment in Athens rose high against Pericles; he was not re-elected to the generalship in the summer of 430, the first time he had failed of election since his rise to power in 461. In 429 Pericles was again chosen general, but he contracted the plague and died in office.

It is scarcely worthwhile to follow the course of the Archidamian War. It seesawed back and forth with victories first on one side and then on the other. The conflict might have stopped at any time since each side was ready to desist at one phase or another. At Athens the mantle of Pericles had fallen upon the demagogue Cleon, a bloodthirsty rabble-rouser who inflamed the passions of the Athenian mob while the brain trust which had one been the guiding force of the Periclean democracy became a minority group without political influence. The conservatives, on the other hand, managed to remain united. They were able to take advantage of the split in the popular faction to gain control after the death of Cleon in 422. At the same time the brilliant Spartan general Brasidas was killed in battle, and without his inspiration the Spartans were willing to cease hostilities. In 421 Nicias, the Athenian conservative leader, arranged for a peace between Athens and Sparta. With Sparta out of the conflict, her allies could not continue the war.

The Peace of Nicias, as it was called, was hailed with joy on both sides, although it pleased some people more than others. Definitely unhappy about this turn of events was the young Alcibiades, Pericles' nephew, who could see no political future for himself under a conservative, peaceful regime. Clever, ambitious, and unscrupulous, Alcibiades began to scheme for a renewal of the war which would bring the popular party and himself into power. He persuaded the Athenians to renew their old friendship with Argos and talked the Argives into organizing a league with Elis, Mantinea, and Tegea. The alliance of these four Peloponnesian towns would draw a line across the Peloponnesus cutting off the Spartans from their allies to the north. The members of the new quadruple alliance were given to understand that Athens would support them if they were attacked by Sparta. Sparta did attack, of course, in 418. No Athenian help was forthcoming. The allies were beaten and bitter; the Spartans were bitter toward Athens too, because even though the Athenians had abstained from hostilities, there had been no doubt of their inimical intentions.

With Nicias advocating friendship with Sparta and Alcibiades the opposite, there was bound to be an ostracism after this affair. For seventy years ostracism had worked wonderfully well for the Athenians. No one had been able to discover a loophole in it, but Alcibiades was cleverer than most. Knowing full well that the contest of 417 would be between himself and Nicias, he proposed to the conservative leader that they should pool their resources, that their respective followers should combine to vote for a third candidate. The choice fell upon poor, simple Hyperbolus, a soap box agitator who was loud but harmless. Hyperbolus was honored with ostracism, and Nicias and Alcibiades remained in Athens to continue their feud. Ostracism was soon discarded by the Athenians.

The drift toward war now became pronounced. In 416 the Athenians demanded that the Dorian inhabitants of the island of Melos, who had observed a strict neutrality in the early phase of the war, should join the Athenian Empire. Melos, of course, would make a fine naval base for operations against the Peloponnesus. The Melians begged to be allowed to retain their neutrality; they wished to remain friendly with Athens, and they did not want to offend their kinsmen of Sparta. The Athenians, however, were brutally insistent. Might was right, they said, and the Melians should submit to Athens and save their skins. The Melians retorted that they had preserved their freedom for centuries and would not give up without a struggle. The Athenians attacked and overwhelmed Melos; the men were put to the sword, the women and children sold into slavery, and the island was repopulated with Athenian colonists. A few people at Athens were shocked by this unprovoked act of barbarism; Euripides, at least, was brave enough to treat the atrocity in a great play, The Trojan Women, in such a way that there would be no doubt of the events to which he referred.

Then came the Sicilian fiasco. In 415 B.C. there arrived in Athens an embassy from the town of Segesta in Sicily. The Segestans were being bullied by the powerful city of Syracuse (Dorian, of course), and they wanted Athenian protection. They told the Athenians how easy the conquest of the rich island of Sicily would be. The possibilities seemed enormous, and the Athenians voted to send a great expedition to aid Segesta and take over Sicily. Outstanding in his support for the idea was Alcibiades, who was the natural leader of the expedition and might have carried it off successfully. But the Athenians managed to find a way to mess up the whole affair: they chose three commanders, including Alcibiades, who believed in the project, Nicias, who did not, and Lamachus, a professional soldier with no definite opinion. To cap the climax, after the Sicilian expedition set sail, Alcibiades was accused of impiety by his enemies at home who secured an order for his arrest. He managed to escape, but the expedition proceeded to Sicily without him where it gained some preliminary successes and laid siege to Syracuse. Blundering by Nicias, however, led to a dismal failure in 413 when the Syracusans, aided by Sparta, destroyed the whole Athenian force.

The Sicilian disaster came at a time when affairs were grim enough at home. Alcibiades had fled to Sparta where he had encouraged the Spartans to resume the Peloponnesian War (414). He even pointed out to them the error of their tactics in the first phase of the conflict; he suggested that they should occupy Attica all year round so that the Athenians would never be able to come out from behind the Long Walls. As a result, the Spartans occupied the Attic fortress of Decelea as a permanent base, and Athenian morale slid to a new low. By 411 the conservatives, hoping for peace, overthrew the democracy by revolution and began negotiations with the enemy. Their plan was foiled by Alcibiades, who had worn out his welcome at Sparta and had now gone to Asia Minor, where he made friends with one of the Persian satraps names Tissaphernes. Alcibiades persuaded Tissaphernes that a Spartan victory was not in the Persian interest. The Spartans had been talking about liberating the Greeks (from Athens), but the next step would be the liberation of the Greeks from Persia, too. The best Persian policy was to keep the Greeks fighting among themselves. Therefore, Persia should intervene to help the Athenians. When Alcibiades, with a promise of Persian aid, turned up at Samos, where the Athenian fleet was mustered in force and where sentiment was against the oligarchic revolution at home, he was warmly welcomed. Word was sent to Athens, and a counterrevolution overthrew the oligarchs and secured the pardon of Alcibiades.

The war went on. For three years (410-407) the tide ran in favor of Athens under the leadership of Alcibiades, but in 407 a naval defeat by one of his subordinates brought censure upon him. When he went into exile to escape execution, the end was in sight. The Persians had taken the advice of Alcibiades to heart; as Athens had begun to win battles under Alcibiades hysteria gripped the Athenians. Part of the fleet was lost in a storm in 406; the remainder was destroyed by a blunder at Aegospotami in 405. In 404 Athens surrendered to the Spartans. As the price of peace, the Atheninas were deprived of their empire, the walls of Athens were torn down, and the democracy was superseded by an oligarchy supported by a Spartan garrison.

No comment on the fall of Athens seems necessary; the Athenians richly deserved their fate. A single footnote, however, is in order: of all their follies the Athenians least merit criticism regarding the Sicilian expedition. Success (which was not all impossible under Alcibiades) would have given the Athenians control of the grain supply of Corinth and the possession of the triangular trade in the west. The Sicilian venture was no harebrained scheme, for Alcibiades was a better strategist than his uncle.

Compiled by: Marko Marelich
Retired Mechanical Engineer
San Francisco, California - USA
September 25, 2006